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1 Introduction
Bourses (or stock exchanges) have origins distant in history. Any group of agents who
agree to trade their assets in fact constitutes a bourse. Over time bourses evolved and
large trading organizations emmerged. By the 20th century, bourses were linked to their
respective national countries, where outsiders were charged high commissions and trading
fees in order to gain access to their liquidity. But the evolution of bourses has never
been as dramatic as in the last decade. In 2007 the European Commission enacted
the Market in Financial Instruments Directive (Mid) to facilitate competition across
the region. The competitors are known as MTFs (Multilateral Trading Facilities). The
change in regulation and the new electronic trading technologies are driving the old-style
stock exchanges out of existence, and they are being progressively replaced by new global
trading organizations. Any bourse can now be created, at convenient low formation costs,
to trade any assets with self-picked traders and assets.1 This possibility was a key element
in the emergence of dark pools of liquidity.2 The following factors inspire the current
research.
Fact Set 1 (Toward a unique global bourse?): In October 2006 the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (CME) and the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) created the worlds largest futures
exchange. In May 2006 the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) (itself a product of the union
between the New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange) acquired Euronext (in
turn the result of the merger between Paris, Amsterdam, and Brussels stock exchanges). In
April 2007 Deutsche Börse acquired the International Securities Exchange (ISE).
Fact Set 2 (Competition by small exchanges): Competition from small exchanges, o¤shore
centers, banks trading consortia, and dark liquidity pools led to an increase in fragmentation in
2008 when the number of trading platforms increased. By 2009 MTFs accounted for about 20%
of the trading in the largest shares across European main markets.
In response to the recent wave of demutualization3, and knowing the importance of
such institutions to the market, we provide an equilibrium model of endogenous bourse
1See Derivatives trading platform bypasses intermediary banks, by Jeremy Grant, in Financial
Times, January 17, 2011.
2Wealthy market participants trading large blocks of shares have smaller costs if the trading occurs in
a dark pool of liquiditythan in standard litexchanges. Those costs are reduced in dark pools since
there is no need of a broker (intermediation cost) and also participants are protected against adverse
share price movements since the trades are privately negotiated.
3Demutualization is the process where traders move freely from their pre-assigned bourses (e.g., na-
tional bourses) to their most preferred ones, without no restriction other than paying the corresponding
membership fee.
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formation. A central concept is our interpretation of a bourse. Precisely, a bourse is
a public good that allows traders to diversify risk by trading its assets with the other
members of the bourse. The attractiveness of a bourse is thus evaluated in the light of
prices for its assets, which ultimately depend on the complementarities in preferences and
endowments among the traders that form the bourse.
We propose an economy with three periods. Traders form bourses in period 0 and
trade assets in their respective bourses in period 1. In period 2 there is uncertainty over
states of nature, when the assets pay returns. Traders evaluate a bourse in period 0 by the
risk sharing possibilities associated with periods 1 and 2. Our distinction among periods
is also pertinent as it captures the fact that the acquisition of a bourse membership (in
period 0) usually involves a commitment for trading in this bourse for a long period of
time.4 Thus, it is di¤erent from the short time activity of asset trading in period 1 -
trading is usually achieved as a matter of seconds within a day. In such a framework,
it is natural to assume that traders are price takers in their decision to enter a bourse -
normally these decisions are not driven by a strategic motive of asset price manipulation.
The model proposed here has its foundations in both the cooperative theory of coalition
formation with local public goods, and the theory of general equilibrium with incomplete
markets (GEI). Our model of bourse formation borrows from the existence result of Al-
louch and Wooders [2008] (hereinafter AW) as it allows us to incorporate explicitly in our
model important characteristics of the bourse industry: large number of traders, price
taking behavior, multiple memberships, competition from small dark pools of liquidity,
and increasing gains from trade in larger bourse sizes, with bourses being possibly un-
bounded in size.5 Other papers in the club / local public goods literature - for instance,
Cole and Prescott [1997] and Ellickson, Grodal, Scotchmer, and Zame [2001], and Wood-
ers [1980, 1978] - do not allow clubs to be unbounded in size). There are other papers that
do allow unbounded club sizes and also consider price-taking equilibrium see Wooders
[1983, 1997] and, more indirectly, Wooders [1994]. Allouch, Conley, and Wooders [2009]
also allow unbounded club sizes, but require that all gains can be realized by coalitions
strictly bounded in size.
The application of AWs existence proof to our bourse economy is not immediate,
4Usually, the exchange participant stays in the bourse since its year of accession. See, for example,
the MICEX list of participants: http://www.micex.com/markets/stock/members/list.
5In this setting, ever-increasing gains from trade in larger bourses (the larger the bourse, the smaller
are the bourse formation per capita cost) is in fact a possibility, but it is not self-imposed in the model.
By considering a large number of traders we can study whether large and small bourses can co-exist in
equilibrium.
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however, since some of AWs assumptions rely on the individuals utility function being
evaluated on the club good. In our paper the utility that the public good (bourse) provides
to the traders is endogenous, as it depends on the tradersevaluation of the risk sharing
possibilities achieved in equilibrium in the di¤erent bourses. Thus, the technical hurdle
to reconcile our model of bourse formation with that of AW is to show that there exists
an open and dense set of economies where the trading equilibrium for any given bourse
structure is continuous in tradersutility and endowment attributes. But our equilibrium
model focuses more than equilibrium existence. We provide a su¢ cient condition for the
emergence of both a large unique bourse, and/or a bourse with complete markets. We also
give several examples that illustrate how tradersattributes and bourse formation costs
explain the di¤erent aspects of bourse formation, such as bourse size and composition,
market incompleteness, and multiple memberships.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the rst that seeks to analyze the specic
market micro-structure of trading in bourses under the lens of club theory. In particular,
we contribute with a di¤erent viewpoint to the market microstructure literature that an-
alyzes the issues of concentration and fragmentation of trade across markets - see Pagano
[1989]6 and related works - and the impact of trading costs on trading behavior7. In our
opinion, this club theory approach to nance is powerful for obtaining new insights on
the functioning of nancial markets, in the same way that the theory of networks and
search theory contribute so much to the understanding of di¤erent issues in nance. This
novel approach provides a useful framework to analyze important issues, such as why do
diverse nancial market structures exist (included incomplete ones) and what are their
welfare implications? More specically, we provide a micro-founded justication of the
emergence of large trading platforms (like the NYSE-Euronext) and also show how, in
some cases, small exchanges are ill-suited to certain types of situations.
The outline is as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 states
the equilibrium concept for our bourses economy, establishes the existence result, and
provides an equilibrium characterization. The key technical contribution relative to earlier
literature is presented at the end of this section. In Section 4 we provide several tractable
numerical examples. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix is devoted for the proofs.
6By fully characterizing non-anonymous traders, we depart from Pagano [1989] and related works in
that we allow for every possible subset of traders to form a bourse, which contrasts with the two-bourse
analysis of Pagano. We also depart from Pagano in that we do not limit our analysis to only one stock
(see Paganos fn. 3). Instead, we consider di¤erent asset structures, possibly incomplete, with more than
one asset.
7See, for example, Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang [2004] for an equilibrium model with xed transaction
costs.
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2 Bourse economies
2.1. Trading
The economy lasts for three periods, 0, 1, and 2. In period 0 traders form bourses; in
period 1 asset trading occurs in each bourse8; and in period 2 assets pay returns. The set of
states of uncertainty in the last period is   f1; :::;g, with representative element : In
each of the three periods all consumers trade commodities in a common market. Traders
are assumed, for all e¤ects, to be price takers in all periods. The set of commodities
is L  f1; :::; Lg, with representative element l: The number of state-time contingent
goods is then (2 + )L: Commodities are traded at prices p = (p0; p1; p(1); :::; p()) 2
IRL+  IRL+  IRL+ ; where p0; p1, and p() are the price vectors at dates 0, 1, and 2 (state
); respectively. Similarly, pl0; pl1, and pl() are the good l prices at dates 0, 1, and 2
(state ), respectively.
An exchange participant or trader is a corporation that may trade on or through the
exchange and is licensed under the ordinance of the corresponding exchange nancial
regulator to carry on asset trading activity. The set of traders is I  f1; :::; ng; with n
assumed to be large but nite. Let  be the set of traderscharacteristics, endowed with
a metric d. An element  2  describes the endowments and preferences of a trader of
this type. We assume that traders characteristics are observable. Let  : I !  be
an attribute function, with (i) =  describing trader is endowments and preferences.9
Then, an economy is represented by a pair (I; ).
Trader i is endowed with a nite positive vector of private commodities !i = (!i0; !
i
1;
(!i();  = 1; :::;)) 2 IRL++IRL++IRL++. We assume that the total endowment of commo-
dities is nite, that is,
P
i2I !
i < 1: We denote by xi = (xi0; xi1; (xi();  = 1; :::;)) 2
IRL+  IRL+  IRL+ trader is consumption bundle. Then, let xI0  (xi0 2 IRL+ : i 2 I) denote
tradersconsumption bundles in period 0, and xI = (xi 2 IRL+ IRL+ IRL+ : i 2 I) denote
traders consumption bundles in the three periods. Let ui(x) denote trader is utility
function dened on the consumption bundle x 2 IR(2+)L+ . In order to introduce a tem-
poral distinction between period 0 (when traders choose bourses) and periods 1 and 2
(when traders already belong to bourses) we assume that the utility function is separable
8For simplicity we assume that trading occurs only once in period 1, although period 1 could have
been modeled as a period that permits multiple trading rounds.
9Our non-anonymous analysis below shows how tradersattributes determine trading behavior. Thus,
this paper departs from those models (e.g., Pagano [1989] and related works) that assume tradersdeci-
sions to depend on the rst and second order moments.
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as follows10
ui(x0; x1; x(1); :::; x()) = u
i
0(x0)u
i
1(x1; x(1); :::; x()): (1)
The utility function proposed in (1) incorporates the idea that traders have an economic
activity at date 0, and thus some consumption and wealth, before entering in a bourse to
exchange its assets. Let us now impose the following assumptions.
(A1.i) For all i 2 I and l 2 L, !il0 >  with  > 0, and given " > 0; there exists  > 0
such that for any set I and pair of economies (I; ) and (I; ); if d((i); (i))   for any
i; then !(i)0  !(i)0 + "1; where 1 = (1; :::; 1) 2 IRL. ui0 is continuous, increasing, and
strictly quasiconcave.
Assumption (A1.i) requires the endowments to be uniformly bounded away from 0, and
for near economies tradersendowments should not di¤er signicantly. The assumptions
on trader is utility at period 0 are standard.
(A1.ii) ui1 is twice continuous di¤erentiable, increasing, and has the matrix of second
derivatives (D2ui1) negative semidenite.
Assumption (A1.ii) on trader is utility evaluated at the consumption in periods 1
and 2 is standard. Notice that we do not need to assume joint concavity of ui as our
equilibrium notion does not require this (see below).
(A1.iii) ui0(x0) = 0 if there exists a commodity l 2 L with xl0 = 0:
Assumption (A1.iii) is merely technical and needed in the proof of Lemma 3 (in the
Appendix) to guarantee that the condition Desirability of endowmentsin AW is satis-
ed.
(A1.iv) Given any attribute  and any " > 0; there is " > 0 such that, for all
i 2 I with (i) =  and all xi0 2 IRL+; ui0(xi0) + " < ui0(xi0 + "1) holds, where  =
mini2I ui1(!
i
1; !
i(1); :::; !i()) > 0:
Assumption (A1.iv) says that private goods in period 0 are valuable.
(A1.v) Given " > 0, there exist " > 0 and  > 0, such that, for any set I and pair
of economies (I; ) and (I; ); if d((i); (i))  ; then u(i)0 (xi0) + " < u(i)0 (xi0+ "1); for
any i and any xi0 2 IRL.
Assumption (A1.v) says that private goods in period 0 are valuable for near economies.
10This specic functional form is considered only for presentation purposes. We emphasize that other
types of functional representations of ui0 and u
i
1 are also admissible. However, we point out that a form
ui0 + u
i
1 is not interesting, as the decision of choosing a bourse does not reect the trading opportunities
associated with a bourse.
6
(A1.vi) Moreover, for " > 0 and for all  2  with (i) = ; u(i)0 (
P
i !
(i)
0 + "1) is
bounded above by some u0, and u
(i)
1 (!
(i)
1 ; !
(i)(1); :::; !(i)()) is uniformly bounded
below from some u
¯ 1
> 0.
Assumption (A1.vi) says that utility ui0 evaluated in a vector above the aggregate en-
dowments does not explode, and that the utility ui1 evaluated at the traders endowments
is also uniformly bounded but now from below. Assumptions (A1.iv), (A1.v) and (A1.vi)
are needed in the proof of Lemma 3 below to prove that Assumption (f) in AW holds,
which in our model requires the traders utility to be continuous in tradersattributes.
Notice that Assumption (A1.i), which characterizes endowments and utility in period 0,
already appeared in AW. However, the remaining assumptions in (A1) di¤er slightly. To
see this, notice that in our economy the club good associated with each bourse, inter-
preted here as the assets trading facility, is endogenous. This implies that the traders
utility attained in each bourse structure is endogenous to the model, whereas in AW the
traders utility attained in each coalition structure is pre-dened. Thus, we must impose
assumptions on our primitives, given the utility functional form specied in (1), in such a
way that AWs assumptions hold (we refer the reader to the proof of our Lemma 3 in the
Appendix, for a more explicit relationship between our assumptions and those of AW).
2.2. Bourse structures
The set of assets available in the economy is nite and denoted by J  f1; ::; Jg. J
denotes the set of all possible nonempty subsets of J. Each bourse has associated some
assets for trading. To each coalition S  I; we assign a set J(S)  J ; which consists
of the di¤erent types of assets that are available for trade in bourse S.11 Then, there
is a mapping S ! A(S), where A(S) = [aj()]J(S) is the payo¤ matrix describing the
returns at each state of nature of the di¤erent assets in J(S). We assume that assets pay in
the numeraire commodity, taken here to be good L: The returns matrix A(S) is assumed
to have full-column rank for each bourse S. We denote a bourse by the pair (S;A(S)):
A bourse is thus a club good that allows traders to diversify their risks by o¤ering the
specic activity of asset trading. As such, a bourse becomes a source of liquidity.
A bourse structure is given by F (I) = f(S1; A(S1)); :::; (Sk; A(Sk)); :::; (SK ; A(SK))g:
We denote by F (I) the set of all possible bourse structures. Given two bourse struc-
tures F (I) = f(Sk; A(Sk))gKk=1 and F (N) = f(S 0k; A(S 0k))gK0k=1, with N  I, let us denote
a feasible deviation from F (I), by a set of traders N , by ~FF (N)(I) = F (N) [ f(Sk \
(InN)); A(Sk \ (InN))gKk=1 (i.e., the bourse structure that contains F (N) and also those
11This set of assets is exogenously given for bourse S, and can be thought as the assets that traders in
bourse S agree to issue for posterior trading.
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bourses in F (I) but without those traders belonging to N). In the equilibrium Denition
2 below, we will use the bourse structure ~FF (N)(I) as the feasible deviation for the set of
traders N . Notice that the set of feasible deviations that we consider is large in the sense
that we allow the traders in N to form any type of bourse structure among them.
Traders can belong to several bourses, and therefore, a bourse structure is not a par-
tition; it is possible that Sk \ Sk0 6= ;. We require the number of bourse memberships
of every trader to be bounded (as in AW) - naturally justied if bourse formation is
expensive-. In order to guarantee that we can always nd a trader for whom the assets
are not collinear among di¤erent bourses, we require that, for any bourse structure, every
bourse has always a trader with no memberships in other bourses. Now, given an eco-
nomy (I; ) and a bourse structure F (I) ; let us denote by F [i; I] = fSk 2 F (I) : i 2 Skg
the set of all bourses in F (I) that contain trader i. Trader i can only trade assets with
those traders in F [i; I]. This implies that, for diversifying risks, traders not only choose
a bourse because of its assets available for trade, but also because of the other traders
wealth and preferences. We denote by yij the trader is position on asset j 2 J(S) in
period 1, with S 2 F [i; I] : As usual, yij > 0 denotes a purchase of asset j and yij < 0
denotes the sale of this asset. Let us denote yI = (yi 2 IRJ(Sk) : Sk 2 F [i; I]; i 2 I): The
prices associated with these assets in S are denoted by q(S) 2 IRJ(S)+ . Notice that our
notion of a bourse is substantially di¤erent from an over-the-counter (OTC) market. In
OTC markets, trading occurs bilaterally (usually between a trader and an intermediary)
and an asset can have a di¤erent price depending on the bargaining of each couple of
traders. Instead, here we model a bourse S as a central market where the asset prices
q(S) are common to all traders in that bourse (like the Tradingpoint Stock Exchange,
that provides direct access to investors, without the need of intermediaries).
2.3. Bourse formation costs, communication costs, and transaction fees
In order to adopt the technology of asset trading and build the trading platform, the
bourse S faces (xed) formation costs z(S) 2 IRL+ (in terms of inputs of the private goods,
e.g., hardware costs, software costs, or installation charges)12. Asset market characteristics
of bourse S are given by the pair (A; z)(S): Let us now impose the following continuity
condition on z with respect to attributes, needed for our existence result below. There,
S and S are the bourses comprising the same traders, but characterized by attributes
 and , respectively.
(A2) Given " > 0; there exists  > 0 such that, for any bourse S and any attribute
12See the HKEx security trading infrastructure at
http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/market/sec_tradinfra/CMTradInfra.htm
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functions  and ; if d((i); (i))   for every i 2 S; then zS  zS + "1:
To fulll the participantship requirement, all exchange participants are required to hold
a bourse membership (or trading right) of the respective exchanges13. The membership
fee that a trader i pays to participate in a bourse S, denoted by i(S), is paid in units of
account and is dependent on traders own type (i) (e.g., broker-dealer and retail investor
participants). A participation price system is a set  = fi(S) 2 IR : i 2 S and S  Ig:
According with our interpretation of a bourse as a club that provides the assets trading
facility (local public good), we allow membership fees to be non-anonymous, so that these
fees reect the tradersvaluation of each bourse.14
For simplicity we do not model trading fees, whose importance has declined substan-
tially since the implementation of the Mid regulation.15 We consider transaction fees
instead, in the form of a transaction levy and a stamp duty, currently at the center of
the debate among the leaders in the European Union. We denote the transaction fee for
trading an amount yj of asset j by gj(yj). Transaction fees are denominated in units of
the numeraire commodity L, and are paid by both sides (buyers and sellers) to a nancial
regulator.16 We assume that gj : IR ! IR+ is twice continuous di¤erentiable (C2) on yj,
increasing in jyjj, and convex in yj (i.e., g00 > 0). Thus, g has a U-shaped form. Indeed,
transaction fees can be non-linear. Typically, most traders pay a constant price per order,
but some traders doing a high volume can sign up for a di¤erent o¤er involving a xed
part and a lower unit price. The debate has focused on the linear part, however. But
with the increase in competition among exchanges, non-linear transaction fees are more
important. From a theoretical point of view, we observe here that the non-linearity of the
transaction fee guarantees that the tradersdemand functions are smooth in a context
with collinear assets among di¤erent bourses (for this result, trading fees do not need to
be large). Finally, we assume that traders face communication costs in period 0 if they
wish to move to di¤erent bourses. These communication costs for a bourse of size jSj are
given by c("0) = "0jSj1, where "0 > 0:
13As stated in the Hong Kong Exchange (HKEx) rules, any broker-dealer intending to operate a
brokerage business for products available on HKEx, using the trading facilities of the Stock Exchange
and/or Futures Exchange, must be admitted and registered as an Exchange Participant of that Exchange.
This membership fee is HK$500,000 (US$64,100).
14Notice that anonymous membership fees can easily be adapted to our theory by making i(S) = (S)
for all i 2 S, where (S) = p0z(S)jSj is the poll tax in bourse S.
15See Colliard [2011] for a survey on this literature and for an analysis of the trading fees on the
e¢ ciency of the markets.
16For the HKEx the transaction levy is 0.003% of the consideration of the transaction, whereas the
stamp duty is 0.001% on the value of stock transactions. These fees are paid to the Securities and Futures
Commission and government, respectively.
9
2.4. Budget constraints
Given prices p0 and i, trader is budget constraint at period 0, when he chooses a set
of bourse memberships, is
p0(x0   !i0) +
X
Sk2F [i;I]
i(Sk)  0: (2)
Observe that the communication costs do not enter in the traders period 0 budget con-
straint since these are paid only if the trader decides to move to another bourse (see also
AW). The prots of bourse S are given by
X
i2S
i(S)  p0z(S): (3)
Given prices p1 and q, the budget constraint in period 1, once trader i has chosen the
bourses he wishes to belong to, is
p1(x1   !i1) +
X
Sk2F [i;I]
X
j2J(Sk)
(qjyj + pL1gj (yj))  0: (4)
Given prices p(), trader is budget constraint in period 2 and node  2  is17
p()(x()  !i())  pL()
X
Sk2F [i;I]
X
j2J(Sk)
aj()yj: (5)
3 Equilibrium
Consistent with our argument that the acquisition of bourse membership (in period 0)
usually involves a commitment for trading in that bourse for a long period of time, whereas
the asset trading activity occurs constantly (in a matter of seconds) in the bourse that
the trader belongs to, we distinguish between the evaluation of bourses (for each bourse
structure traders assess the risk sharing attained in their respective bourses) and the
formation of bourses (bourses are formed given these evaluations).
3.1. Bourse evaluation
Denition 1 (Asset trading equilibrium for a given bourse structure): Given the
bourse structure F (I); a price taking asset trading equilibrium consists of a system
(xI1; x
I(1); :::; xI(); yI ; p; q)(F (I)); such that,
17Observe that in period 2 tradersdefault is not allowed. See Santos and Scheinkman [2001] for a
leading model with default and two clearing-houses.
10
(D1.i) given traders bourse memberships F [i; I], the trader chooses optimally his commodi-
ties and assets positions, that is, (xi1; x
i(1); :::; xi(); yi)(F (I)) 2 argmaxui1(x1; x(1);
:::; x()), subject to constraints (4) and (5).
(D1.ii) commodity markets clear at periods 1 and 2, i.e.
 Pi2I(xil1   !il1) = 0, for all l 6= L:
 Pi2I(xiL1 +PSk2F [i;I]Pj2J(Sk) gj  yij  !iL1) = 0.
 Pi2I (xil()  !il()) = 0; for all l and  2 .
(D1.iii) the asset market clears for each bourse, i.e.
P
i2Sk y
i
j = 0; 8j 2 J(Sk); 8Sk 2 F (I):
We denote the set of asset trading equilibria, given a bourse structure F (I); by E(F (I)):
3.2. Bourse formation
First, observe that, given the bourse structure F (I); our specication of the utility
function (1) allows us to dene the trader is utility in period 0 via an equilibrium point18
~x(F [i; I])  (x1; x(1); :::; x())(F [i; I]) as follows
V i(x0; F [i; I])  ui0(x0)U i1 (F [i; I]) (6)
where
U i1 (F [i; I])  ui1(~x(F [i; I])) (7)
denotes the trader is indirect utility, the utility ui1() evaluated at the equilibrium point
~x(F [i; I]): Observe that the evaluation of traders bourse memberships enters indirectly
into his utility ui through the access to income and the risk sharing that he gains from
trading the securities o¤ered in those bourses he belongs to. The following proposition
asserts that the utility evaluated at the assets trading equilibrium ~x (F [i; I]) is continuous
in traders attributes. There, we write I to refer to an economy (I; ), and call an open
and dense set with null complement a generic set.
Proposition 1: There exists a generic set of economies for which, given  > 0; there
is a  > 0 such that, for any pair of economies (I; ) and (I; ); if d((i); (i))   for
any i; then jU(i)1 (F [i; I])  U(i)1
 
F [i; I]
 j < :
Condition (f) in AW requires that traders who are similar in attribute space are near-
substitutes in the economy. For our bourse economy this is not a trivial issue, as the public
good in our paper is endogenous to the model, and this makes the utility ui1(~x(F [i; I])
18We consider a measurable selector from the equilibrium correspondence E(F (I)) (see the Appendix).
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dependent on the assets trading equilibrium. In Proposition 1 we demonstrate that there
exists an open and dense set of tradersattributes (endowments and utilities) for which
the assets trading equilibrium is continuous in tradersattributes. This proof is the most
critical point for the application of AWs existence result to our economy. The proof of
Proposition 1, in the Appendix, makes use of the Transversality theorem. For simplicity,
we consider a nite dimensional manifold of utility functions.19
It is also important to note that V i(x0; F [i; I])may represent ever-increasing gains from
trade in larger bourse sizes, depending on how ui0(x0) and u
i
1 (~x(F [i; I])) interrelate in the
functional form dictated by ui(x0; ~x(F [i; I])). In order for this possibility to be compatible
with equilibrium existence, we need to impose the following assumption:
(A3) There is a bundle of goods x0 2 IRL+ such that for any economy (I; ), any
consumer i 2 I; and any xi 2 IRL+  IRL++  IRL++, we have
ui0(x
i
0 + x

0)u
i
1(x
i
1; x
i(1); :::; xi())  ui0(xi0)ui1
X
i
 
!i1; !
i(1); :::; !i()

:
Assumption A3 permits ever-increasing gains from larger and larger bourseswhile,
at the same time, allows for small bourses. The assumption says that, even in the
worst scenario where trader i cannot diversify risk in any bourse and, as a consequence,
may consume an inferior bundle (xi1; x
i(1); :::; xi()), the trader prefers to consume a very
large amount of private goods in period 0, xi0 + x

0, rather than consuming the total
endowments in periods 1 and 2. Notice that the consumption xi0 + x

0 can be very large
and even unfeasible for the trader - we require only the existence of such a large bundle
x0. Assumption A3 assures that the Desirability of wealthassumption of AW holds for
our economy.
Denition 2 (c("0)-equilibrium of the bourse formation): A price taking c("0)-bourse
structure equilibrium for period 0 is an ordered triple ((xI0; F (I)); p0;) that consists of
an allocation of commodities xI0; a bourse structure F (I); a commodity price vector p0,
and a participation price system  such that,
(D2.i)
P
i2I(x
i
0   !i0) +
P
Sk2F (I) z(Sk)  0:
(D2.ii) For each S  I; prots are non positive, i.e.,
X
i2S
i(S)  p0z(S)  0.
(D2.iii) for each i 2 I, any N  I with i 2 N , and any bourse structure deviation ~FF (N)[i; I],
if V i(yi0; ~FF (N)[i; I]) > V
i(xi0; F [i; I]); then p0(y
i
0 !i0)+
X
Sk2 ~FF (N)[i;I]
i(Sk) >  "0p01:
19Extending our framework to consider instead an innite dimensional manifold of utility functions
would complicate substantially the proofs, and thus is left for some future research.
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The equilibrium condition (D2.iii) says that, if a set of traders N deviates and forms
another bourse structure with the remaining traders of I staying in the same bourses as
in F (I) but without the traders of N , then the budget constraints of those traders in N
are violated in excess of the communication costs. These communication costs consist
of small frictions in the economy, which a¤ect the opportunities to change bourse mem-
berships. Also, notice that V i(yi0; ~FF (N)[i; I]) is well dened since it is the indirect utility
evaluated at the trading equilibrium associated with the bourse structure ~FF (N)(I): Since
the equilibrium selection ~x( ~FF (N)[i; I]) is dened for any bourse structure that contains
all traders in I we have that it is uniquely dened. Finally, the o¤-equilibrium deviating
bourses that we consider belong to the bourse structure ~FF (N)(I). Such deviating bourses
have always associated a trading equilibrium, and therefore are feasible.
An additional equilibrium condition in Denition 2 would be to require that most
consumers cannot be very far outside their budget constraints. As AW remark, this
condition can be derived from conditions of the model and other parts of the denition
of equilibrium for the bourse formation process. Therefore, we omit such condition in
Denition 2. It may also occur that, depending on the composition of the set of traders,
some traders cannot be accommodated in their preferred bourses. AW show that if
the economy is large, then these traders constitute only a small proportion of the total
population. For that, AW accommodate the equilibrium notion by taking into account
these reminders. We prefer to avoid further notation and refer to the original paper for
such renement.
3.3. Equilibrium for the bourse economy
Finally, we introduce the equilibrium concept associated with the bourse economy
proposed here.
Denition 3 (c("0)-equilibrium of the bourse economy): We say that the vector (((xI0; F (I);
p0;); (x
I
1; x
I(1); :::; xI(); yI ; p; q)(F (I))) constitutes a price taking c("0)-equilibrium for
our bourse economy if
(D3.i) (xI0; F (I); p0;) is a c("0)-equilibrium for the bourse formation.
(D3.ii) (xI1; x
I(1); :::; xI(); yI ; p; q)(F (I)) is an asset trading equilibrium for F (I).
Observe that for a given bourse structure F (I) there can be more than one asset trad-
ing equilibrium. It is well known that di¤erent beliefs among traders on the equilibrium
realizations may lead to a problem of non-existence. To avoid this possibility we impose
the standard rational expectations hypothesis (see Dutta and Morris [1997]); that is,
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traders agree on the realization of prices at each state (consensus) and simultaneously
believe that there is a single possible price in each state (degenerate beliefs). No informa-
tion problems are considered here. Thus, tradersbeliefs about the realization of prices
in each state are self-fullling.
3.4. Existence
Theorem 1: Let us assume A1, A2, and A3. If there are su¢ ciently many traders
with attributes represented in the economy, there exists a generic set of bourse economies
for which there is a price taking c("0)-equilibrium with possibly ever-increasing gains from
larger bourses.
The proof of Theorem 1 is left for the Appendix. In this proof we rst show that a
trading equilibrium exists given a bourse structure. Notice that we do not require short
sales to be bounded. A subtlety in this part of the proof is that market clearing no longer
occurs for the whole economy (as in previous general equilibrium models), but occurs in
each bourse.20 In the second part of the proof we show that there exists a measurable
selector of the trading equilibria (recall that there can exist more than one), at which
traders evaluate their bourse memberships. Finally, we show that a bourse structure
equilibrium exists, given the bourse evaluation at the selected trading equilibrium.
The existence result of a c("0)-equilibrium of the bourse formation relies on AW [2008,
Theorem 2], which says that: under appropriate assumptions (namely, (a)-(h) and desir-
ability of wealth- see our proof of Lemma 3 below), there exists a "0-price taking equi-
librium with communication costs if there exist su¢ ciently many players with attributes
represented in the economy (that is, with attributes in the range of ()).
Technical contribution: The application of AWs result to our economy is not imme-
diate. We need to assure that all assumptions required in AW [2008, Theorem 2] are
satised. The trickiest one is their assumption (f) (utility of a bourse structure is con-
tinuous on the attributes; see proof of Lemma 3 in the Appendix). This cannot be an
assumption in our model because the utility that a trader obtains in a bourse (public
good) is endogenous in our setup. Proposition 1 proves continuity on tradersattributes
for a generic set of economies. In this proof we follow the lines of Geanakoplos and Pole-
marchakis [1986, Section 6]. There are three di¢ cult steps in this proof. The rst is that
we have to show that the assets trading equilibrium is a continuous di¤erentiable function
of commodity and asset prices. The second di¢ culty has to do with equilibrium regular-
ity. Precisely, we have to show that, there exists a generic set of endowments and utilities,
20Neither does the related eld of security design properly model bourses as the place where traders
issue and trade securities.
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such that the set of asset trading equilibria is a continuously di¤erentiable function of the
endowment and utility assignment. Our framework is however di¤erent than Geanakoplos
and Polemarchakis [1986], as we must adapt their proof to our economy where: 1) the
asset market clearing occurs in each bourse; 2) the trading period accounts for assets and
commodities; and 3) trading of assets involve paying a non-linear transaction fee (in order
to come across the collinearity of asset returns among di¤erent bourses), which is itself a
function of the assets trading. The third di¢ culty is that, for each economy in a generic
set of endowments and utilities, we have to nd a compact subset (this set exists because
the generic set is open), and use this set as the compact set used by AW to extend replica
economies.21
3.5. Positive predictions
In this paper we are also able to provide a su¢ cient condition for the formation of a
unique large bourse, and also for the formation of a bourse with complete markets. For
this, we consider a framework with one commodity and single membership. We shall take
as given the tradersindirect utilities derived from trading in their respective bourses.22
Su¢ cient condition (SC): For any S and S, and  2 R, the following inequality
holds:
z(S)
X
i2S

U i1(S
)
U i1(S)

  z(S) 
X
i2S

U i1(S
)
U i1(S)

  1

!i0
Condition (SC) becomes less binding the higher is the relative value of bourse S
with respect to bourse S (U i1(S
)=U i1(S)), and the lower is di¤erence between bourse S

formation cost (z(S)) and bourse S formation cost of (z(S)). By bourse S we refer
either to a large unique bourse or to a bourse with complete markets, whereas by bourse
S we refer either to a small bourse or a bourse with incomplete markets, respectively.
Proposition 2: Let us assume that, for all i 2 I, the inverse of ui0 is homogeneous
of degree , and also that, for any bourse ~S  I, each traderendowment does not exceed
the cost of forming a bourse (i.e., for all i, !i0  z( ~S)). Then,
(2.1) a large unique bourse S, with jSj = jIj, forms in equilibrium if condition (SC)
holds, for any bourse S with jSj < jIj.
(2.2) a bourse with complete markets S forms in equilibrium if condition (SC) holds, for
any bourse S with incomplete markets.
21AWs result relies on the use of a compact set of attributes where the continuity property on traders
attributes for a generic set of economies holds.
22In the examples below, we show how bourse membersattributes and bourse structure determine the
indirect utility U i1 (F [i; I]) :
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On the one hand, Result (2.1) in Proposition 2 is interesting as it gives a prediction -
based on the relationship among the technology of bourse formation, tradersendowments,
and tradersvaluation of bourses - for the formation of a unique global bourse. Thus,
this result helps to clarify which conditions will make trading in a single global exchange
a natural monopoly23. On the other hand, Result (2.2) in Proposition 2 gives a su¢ cient
condition for markets to be complete, and thus for the asset trading equilibrium to be
e¢ cient.24 Moreover, we can also assert that equilibrium of the bourse formation process
is also e¢ cient, following the result of AW, who show that a "0-equilibrium is in the
core for an economy with su¢ ciently many traders of each attribute. Therefore, an
c("0)-equilibrium of the bourse economy is e¢ cient if condition (SC) holds. This result
contributes to the recent literature on endogenous market completeness.25
4 Complementarities, technology, and optimal bourse
structures: Examples
Next, we provide several examples that illustrate the various trade-o¤s among the bourse
formation costs, trading complementarities, and the inherent asset structure of the bourses.
Example 1 illustrates how the bourse structure a¤ects welfare and trading volume through
varying complementarities among di¤erent sets of traders. Motivated by Fact Set 1, Ex-
ample 2 shows that large bourses form in equilibrium when bourse formation costs are
proportional in size, as long as there exist good complementarities among traders. Exam-
ple 3 provides the opposite case, pointed out in Fact Set 2, where small bourses provide
more welfare given the bad complementarities in a larger bourse, with formation cost
again proportional in size. Example 4 provides a case with multiple memberships, and
compares di¤erent bourse structures for di¤erent technology scenarios. Finally, Example
5 focuses on the endogeneity of the market incompleteness and the related ine¢ ciency.
All examples below are valid for any N -replication of these economies (see explanations
in Example 3). In these examples, for simplicity the transaction fee is made equal to
zero, as the main insights of the examples remain valid. Our terminology should give
23Liquidity and technology will inevitably make trading a natural monopoly. See The Economist,
March 25, 2006 (http://www.economist.com/node/6978712).
24The issue of the optimality of the equilibrium is related to previous results in the literature of general
equilibrium with incomplete markets. A well known argument is that equilibrium e¢ ciency is con-
strainedto the market incompleteness. This result naturally extends to our asset trading equilibrium.
25See Carvajal, Rostek, and Weretka (2012) for a model of competition in nancial innovation and a
result on the endogeneity of market completeness, and references therein.
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no space to confusion since we always give a name to each set of numbers, indicating its
nature. For example, the set S1 = (1; 2) indicates a bourse with traders 1 and 2, the set
 = f1; 2g indicates that the states of nature under consideration are 1 and 2, and the
set A(S) = f(1; 1); (1; 2)g indicates that there are two assets, the rst paying one unit in
each of the two states of nature, whereas the second asset is paying one unit in the rst
state of nature and two units in the second state of nature.
Example 1 (Bourse structure a¤ects welfare): Our objective in this rst example
is to compare three di¤erent economies, one with trader set S1 = (1; 2), another with
S2 = (1; 2; 3), and another with S3 = (1; 2; 4): In this simple example, we shall focus
on the bourse evaluation process, which is necessary for the analysis of period 0 in the
following examples. We consider just one good for consumption at each node. Trading
of assets and commodities occurs as described in the model above. The set of states
of nature in period 2 is  = f1; 2g. The asset structure is assumed to be complete,
with A(S) = f(1; 1); (1; 2)g ; for all S = S1; S2; S3. Traders attributes for the di¤er-
ent economies are dened as follows. Trader is utility is ui1(x1; x(1); x(2)) = 
i
1 lnx1
+i(1) lnx(1)+ i(2) lnx(2): Traders 1 and 2s endowments and preference parameters are
(!11; !
1(1); !1(2)) = (2; 2; 6); (11; 
1(1); 1(2)) = (1; 1; 0), (!21; !
2(1); !2(2)) = (2; 6; 2) and
(21; 
2(1); 2(2)) = (1; 0; 1), respectively. We perform comparative statics with the three
economies. Trader 3 is rich today and prefers to consume today, i.e., (!31; !
3(1); !3(2)) =
(6; 2; 2) and (31; 
3(1); 3(2)) = (1; 1=2; 1=2). Trader 4 is rich today and prefers to con-
sume tomorrow, i.e., (!41; !
4(1); !4(2)) = (6; 2; 2) and (41; 
4(1); 4(2)) = (1=2; 1; 1). Ob-
serve that trader 4 allows traders 1 and 2 to transfer wealth to those nodes where con-
sumption is more valued to them. Trader 3 is not bound to make such transfers, as trader
3 has high endowments in the node where he most values consumption (period 1). Thus,
trader 4 has better complementarities (in endowments and preferences) with traders 1
and 2 than trader 3 has. Moreover, trader 4 allows traders 1 and 2 to better diversify
their risk in bourse S3 than if they were alone in bourse S1. Let us abbreviate notation
and redene U i1(F [i; I])  U i1(S), with i 2 S (as in this example each trader belongs to
just one bourse). The following tables give the tradersindirect utilities and portfolios for
di¤erent bourses.26
S1 = (1; 2) S2 = (1; 2; 3) S3 = (1; 2; 4)
U11 (S
1) = 2:7726
U21 (S
1) = 2:7726
n:a:
U11 (S
2) = 2:8904
U21 (S
2) = 2:8904
U31 (S
2) = 2:7726
U11 (S
3) = 3:0754
U21 (S
3) = 3:0754
U41 (S
3) = 3:3965
26The numerical computation procedure for this example and the following ones can be found in the
working paper Faias and Luque [2011].
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Table 1: Indirect utilities for a given bourse structure
S1 = (1; 2) S2 = (1; 2; 3) S3 = (1; 2; 4)
(y11(S); y
1
2(S)) (18; 12) (14; 10) (12:5882; 9:2941)
(y21(S); y
2
2(S)) ( 18; 12) ( 16; 10) ( 15:2941; 9:2941)
(y31(S); y
3
2(S)) n.a. (2; 0) n.a.
(y41(S); y
4
2(S)) n.a. n.a. (2:7058; 0)
Table 2: Asset trading
In Table 1 we can see that the indirect utilities of traders 1 and 2 are substantially
greater when they trade in the bourse with trader 4 than when they trade in the bourse
with trader 3. Table 2 shows that trading in di¤erent bourses results in di¤erent trading
volumes.27 These observations indicate that trading complementarities are, indeed, an
important determinant of traderswelfare and asset trading. |
Example 2: (Large bourses are optimal if trading complementarities are good): Being
inspired by Fact Set 1, we illustrate here how good trading complemetarities are enough
for a large bourse to emerge. Let us add to the set-up presented in Example 1 an initial
period 0 where bourses form. We assume no uncertainty between periods 0 and 1. Our
framework is again characterized by non-anonymity and market completeness. We restrict
our attention to the set of traders I = f1; 2; 4g. The possible bourses are S1 = (1; 2);
S3 = (1; 2; 4); S4 = (1; 4), and S5 = (2; 4). Let ui0(x0) = (1=2) lnx0, where x0 is the good
consumption in period 0. The modied utility function is then V i(x0; S) = ui0(x0)U
i
1(S) =
(1=2) lnx0[
i
1 lnx
i
1 + 
i(1) lnxi(1)+ i(2) lnxi(2)]. Good endowments in period 0 are
!10 = 7; !
2
0 = 7 and !
4
0 = 5:9. In period 0 traders must pay for the membership fee to
have access to the bourse trading facility. Membership fees cover the bourse formation
cost. Trader is membership fee in bourse S is denoted by i(S): We compute the non-
anonymous membership fees by considering a welfarist agent that maximizes the weighted
sum of indirect utilities subject to individual budget constraints in period 0. It can be
shown that the optimal membership fee for a trader i in a two-traders bourse S = (i; k)
is given by
i(S) =
Uk1 (S)!
i
0   U i1(S)!k0
U i1(S) + U
k
1 (S)
+
U i1(S)
U i1(S) + U
k
1 (S)
z(S) (8)
27We can dene trading volume of an asset j in a bourse S by j(S)  12
P
i2S jyij(S)j, where the
coe¢ cient 1/2 corrects for the double counting when summing the trades over all traders. Then, using
the values in Table 2, we can order trading volumes as j(S
1) > j(S
2) > j(S
3); for j = 1; 2: Observe
that a higher volume of trade does not necessarily correlate with traderswelfare. In fact, in this example,
trading volume is lower when traderswelfare is higher.
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whereas if it is a three-traders bourse S = (i; j; k) we would have
i(S) =
!i0

U j1 (S) + U
k
1 (S)
  U i1(S)(!j0 + !k0)
U i1(S) + U
j
1 (S) + U
k
1 (S)
+
U i1(S)
U i1(S) + U
j
1 (S) + U
k
1 (S)
z(S) (9)
These formulas give an e¢ cient characterization of the non-anonymous bourse mem-
bership pricing.28 Notice that in both cases the equilibrium membership fee equations
consist of the sum of a pure transfer (rst term on the right hand side) and a poll tax
(second term). The poll tax is such that all traders share the bourse Ss formation
cost z(S): The pure transfer reects the traders valuation of the trading opportunities
in bourse S. Then,
P
i2S 
i(S) = z(S). We consider bourse formation costs of the
form z(S) = 3jSj. These costs are proportional to the bourse size29 because we seek to
emphasize the role of complementarities in tradersattributes (we wish to see the comple-
mentarities as the driving force that determine the bourse composition). The membership
fee values are 1(S1) = 2(S1) = 3; 1(S4) = 2(S5) = 4:0022; 4(S4) = 4(S5) = 1:9978;
1(S3) = 2(S3) = 3:4889 and 4(S3) = 2:0222: The indirect utilities are30
S1 = (1; 2) S4 = (1; 4) S5 = (2; 4) S3 = (1; 2; 4)
Trader 1 V 1(S1) = 1:9218 V 1(S4) = 1:3418 u1(!1) = 1:3488 V 1(S3) = 1:9312
Trader 2 V 2(S1) = 1:9218 u2(!2) = 1:3488 V 2(S5) = 1:3418 V 2(S3) = 1:9312
Trader 4 u4(!4) = 2:0253 V 4(S4) = 2:1662 V 4(S5) = 2:1662 V 4(S3) = 2:3016
Table 3: Indirect utilities in period 0
In this example with complete markets and proportional bourse formation costs, we
nd that the three traders prefer to sort in the largest possible bourse, S3 = (1; 2; 4). This
happens even if traders 1 and 2 have to pay a higher membership fee in the three-trader
bourse, since the gain in utility of the bourse evaluation process more than o¤sets this
extra cost. Thus, good complementarities in preferences and endowments are su¢ cient
here to obtain a large bourse in equilibrium. |
28An anonymous pricing context would make better (worse) o¤ those traders who value more (less)
the bourse than if the context were non-anonymous (not all surplus can be subtracted when pricing is
anonymous).
29Denoting by jSj the cardinality of S, we say that two bourses S1 and S2 with jS1j < jS2j have bourse
formation costs: proportional in size if z(S
1)
jS1j =
z(S2)
jS2j ; more than proportional in size if
z(S1)
jS1j <
z(S2)
jS2j , and
less than proportional in size if z(S
1)
jS1j >
z(S2)
jS2j :
30The indirect utility of a trader who does not belong to a bourse is given by his utility ui evaluated in
his good endowments (recall that there is only one good and ui is strictly increasing in the consumption
of the good).
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Example 3: (Size versus tailored e¢ ciency31) This example illustrates the case oppo-
site to Example 2, that poor complementarities alone can lead a small bourse to form in
equilibrium. We assume that markets are complete. For this example it is worth consid-
ering larger replica bourses with N traders of each type. For example, in the three-traders
bourse case, the bourse S2N = (1; 2; 3)
N will denote a bourse composed by N traders of
each type. Observe that for any given bourse SN with m types of traders and N traders
of each type, the indirect utility (given in Example 1) of a given trader i is such that
U i(S) = U i(SN); for any N 2 N:32 This remains true for all the examples in this pa-
per. Again, we assume that bourse formation costs are proportional to bourse size in
order to isolate the role of complementarities on the equilibrium outcome. In particular,
we assume z(SN) = 3N jSN j; for any bourse SN : Trader 3s endowment in period 0 is
!30 = 5:9: Our objective here is to compare the small bourse S
1 = (1; 2) with the large
bourse S2N = (1; 2; 3)
N ; with N large, where the third trader has poor complementarities
with traders 1 and 2. The indirect utilities in these bourses are
S1 = (1; 2) S2N = (1; 2; 3)
N
Trader 1 V 1(S1) = 1:9218 V 1(S2N) = 1:8843
Trader 2 V 2(S1) = 1:9218 V 2(S2N) = 1:8843
Trader 3 u3(!3) = 2:0253 V 3(S2N) = 1:7498
Table 4: Indirect utilities at period 0
In Table 4 we see that all traders have a greater indirect utility in bourse S1 = (1; 2)
than in the larger bourse S2N = (1; 2; 3)
N ; for any N (possibly large). This result contrasts
with the values given in Table 1, where traders 1 and 2 prefer to be in a larger bourse with
trader 3 (there, only the bourse evaluation process was under consideration). However, in
the bourse formation process, the benet for traders 1 and 2 of enlarging the bourse with
a third trader with poor complementarities (like trader 3) is not enough to compensate
the cost of paying a higher membership fee - in bourse S1 the membership fee for both
traders 1 and 2 is 3, while in bourse S2N the membership fee is 
1(S2) = 2(S2) = 3:3166
(and 3(S2) = 2:3667 for trader 3). We conclude that poor complementarities between
31The properties of self-picked traders and assets motivate the expression tailored-e¢ ciency.
32To see this, notice that commodities and assets market clearing equations in SN are the same as
in S. Also, the membership pricing expressions (8) and (9) hold true for any N -replica bourse with
formation cost z(SN ) = Nz(S): For example, in an N -replica two-traders bourse, the objective function
would be N
 
lnxi0

U i(SN )+ N(lnx
j
0)U
j(SN ), given the restriction Ni(SN ) +Nj(SN ) = Nz(S): This
maximization problem is equivalent to the same problem when N = 1. Thus, this result relates to
Allouch, Conley, and Wooders [2009], where a group strictly bounded in size can achieve all gains to club
formation.
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trader 3 and traders 1 and 2 leads to a situation where the small bourse S1 is preferred
in equilibrium by traders of types 1 and 2 to the larger bourse S2N , for any N -replica.
This result identies poor traderscomplementarities (in preferences and endowments)
as an important force against the tendency toward a unique bourse. This example is in
accordance with Fact Set 2, which suggests that traditional large exchanges are ill-suited
to certain types of institutions (e.g., dark liquidity pools). |
Remark 1: What is the e¤ect of the implementation of a Tobin tax on certain (but not
all) bourses? It can easily be shown that for two possible bourses - subject to legislation
by regulators - with the same traders and asset structure, traders will participate in the
bourse with lower execution rates for their trades. Higher execution rates in a bourse, due
to a Tobin tax (see Tobin [1984]), can be accommodated in the form of higher formation
cost, which penalizes traders in that bourse through higher memberships. As traders
are free to move to their most preferred bourse, we can infer that the bourse with such
high execution rates (or equivalently, high formation costs) may not be formed. In other
words, if traders are free to choose their preferred bourses, then a Tobin tax on the
nancial transactions in some but not all bourses may not be e¤ective. This result adds
to the current debate on international nancial transactions (Stiglitz [1989]).
Example 4: (Multiple memberships): Let us now consider an example with mul-
tiple memberships. Traders names are now 5, 6, and 7. Traders endowments and
preferences parameters are (!50; !
5
1; !
5(1); !5(2)) = (15; 6; 2; 2); (50; 
5
1; 
5(1); 5(2)) =
(1=2; 1=2; 1; 0), (!60; !
6
1; !
6(1); !6(2)) = (9; 2; 6; 6); (60; 
6
1; 
6(1); 6(2)) = (1=2; 1; 0; 1=2),
(!70; !
7
1; !
7(1); !7(2)) = (9; 2; 6; 6), and (70; 
7
1; 
7(1); 7(2)) = (1=2; 1; 1=2; 0). We as-
sume that every possible bourse has an incomplete asset structure with only one as-
set with payo¤s (1; 1): Traders 6 and 7 are similar in preferences and endowments and,
therefore, the two interesting bourse structures to compare are fS6; S7g = f(5; 6); (5; 7)g
and fS8g = f(5; 6; 7)g; one with multiple memberships where trader 5 is common to
both bourses, and the other with all traders in a single bourse. We consider that
bourse formation costs are z(S) = 3jSj if S = S6; S7; and z(S) = 7jSj if S = S8:
One possible justication of these bourse formation costs follows a location argument.
Trader 5 can be thought of as in between traders 6 and 7, and this location causes the
cost of creating the bourse S6 or S7 to be smaller than z(S8).33 Indirect utilities are
V 5(fS6; S7g) = 2:1239 and V 6(S6) = V 7(S7) = 1:9406 for structure fS6; S7g; while
V 5(S8) = 1:9512 and V 6(S8) = V 7(S8) = 1:2171 for the unique bourse. For these values,
33For these costs, memberships are 5(S6) = 5(S7) = 4:7619 and 6(S6) = 7(S7) = 1:2380 for the
multiple membership scenario, whereas 5(S8) = 10:2310 and 6(S8) = 7(S8) = 5:3846 for the unique
bourse.
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all traders prefer the bourse structure f(5; 6); (5; 7)g: Therefore, one insight of this exam-
ple is that low bourse formation costs for bourses with traders located relatively close
can explain the existence of multiple memberships in equilibrium. Another insight is
that it is not necessarily true that a multiple membership scenario is Pareto superior to
a unique bourse scenario, or vice versa. To see this, we can consider instead a smaller
z(S8); for instance, if z(S) = 3jSj for S = S6; S7; S8: Then traders 6 and 7 can be shown
to be better o¤with multiple memberships, but trader 5 would be better o¤ in the unique
bourse.34 |
Example 5 (Market incompleteness as a consequence of bourse formation costs and
complementarities): We consider an economy with new traders, named traders 8; 9,
and 10. Traders endowments and preferences parameters are (!80; !
8
1; !
8(1); !8(2)) =
(10; 6; 2; 1); (80; 
8
1; 
8(1); 8(2)) = (1=2; 1=2; 1; 0), (!90; !
9
1; !
9(1); !9(2)) = (6; 2; 6; 1); (90;
91; 
9(1); 9(2)) = (1=2; 1; 1=2; 0), (!100 ; !
10
1 ; !
10(1); !10(2)) = (6; 2; 6; 1) and (100 ; 
10
1 ;
10(1); 10(2)) = (1=2; 1=2; 1; 1=2).
The possible bourses are S9 = (8; 9); S10 = (8; 10); S11 = (9; 10), and S12 = (8; 9; 10):
The asset structure is complete, with A(S) = f(1; 1); (1; 2)g ; for bourses S = S10; S11; S12,
but incomplete for bourse S9; A(S9) = f(1; 1)g. We consider that bourses S10, S11; and S12
have formation costs proportional to their sizes, with z(S) = 3jSj, for S = S10; S11; S12;
but assume that bourse S9 has less than proportional formation cost of the form z(S9) =
2jS9j to illustrate that it is cheaper to provide an incomplete asset structure than a
complete one.
S9 = (8; 9) S10 = (8; 10) S11 = (9; 10) S12 = (8; 9; 10)
V 8(S9) = 1:7416 V 8(S10) = 1:3581 V 8(f8g) = 1:546 V 8(S12) = 1:6734
V 9(S9) = 1:7416 V 9(f9g) = 1:546 V 9(S11) = 1:1638 V 9(S12) = 1:4728
V 10(f10g) = 2:0805 V 10(S10) = 1:7262 V 10(S11) = 1:7741 V 10(S12) = 1:6973
Table 5: Indirect utilities at period 0
From the results in Table 5, we conclude that, if bourse S9 formation costs are (ap-
propriately) less than proportional to bourse size, then traders 8 and 9 end up strictly
preferring the incomplete asset structure associated with bourse S9, even if a complete
asset structure is available in another bourse. In Example 5 we can see how technology,
in the form of bourse formation costs, plays a crucial role in determining the incomplete-
ness of the markets. Thus, we conclude that the incompleteness of the asset structure is
34For these proportional bourse formation costs, indirect utilities for the unique bourse are V 5(S8) =
2:5456 and V 6(S8) = V 7(S8) = 1:8735:
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endogenous to the model, and crucially depends on the technology associated with the
bourse formation costs.35|
5 Final remarks
This paper is pioneering in examining nancial market structures and their welfare prop-
erties under the new perspective of club theory. The paper provides the rst equilibrium
model of bourse formation, where a bourse is a nancial platform that allows traders to
share risks by exchanging assets. In our view this is an important conceptualization of
an exchange, and opens a new way for analyzing competition among exchanges using the
powerful theory of group formation. Our hope is to bring to the eld of nancial eco-
nomics, and to the market microstructure in particular, the powerful tool of club theory.
Our approach revealed interesting insights on the optimal size of a bourse. The paper also
addresses the question of what forces drive the e¢ ciency of equilibrium. We relate the
endogeneity of complete markets to the existing technology of bourse formation, traders
valuation of bourses, and their endowments. We also think that the paper paves the way
to study other interesting questions, like default, formation of clearing houses, and the
contagion e¤ects associated with multiple bourse memberships.
6 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: This Theorem follows by Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 below. The proof
of existence of equilibrium is not trivial anymore. It requires elaboration. Lemma 1
constructs a sequence of truncated economies and shows that equilibrium exists for this
truncation. Then, we show that there exists equilibrium for the limit of this sequence
of truncations. It is important to notice that for this proof we do not need to assume
bounded short sales (securities pay in the numeraire commodity). Lemma 2 proves that
there exists a measurable selector of the asset trading equilibria in which a trader evaluates
his utility in period 0 (to acquire bourse memberships). In Lemma 3 we show that
there exists a generic set of bourse economies for which there is ac(")-equilibrium with
possibly ever-increasing gains from larger bourses. The most di¢ cult and subtle part of
the proof is to guarantee that assumption (f) in AW(2008) holds. For this proof we need
35Other approaches to obtain market incompleteness consider issuing costs faced by intermediaries
who o¤er securities in a context of imperfect competition, or some type of collateral requirements for the
household borrowers.
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to use Proposition 1. For convenience of exposition we present the proof of Proposition 1
immediately after the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: Let us assume (A1.ii). Then, for a xed bourse structure, there exists an
asset trading equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 1: Let us consider a generalized game where allocated consumption
and portfolios are restricted to a closed cube K  IR(+1)L+
P
S2F (I) J(S) with center at the
origin and large enough to contain the double of the aggregate endowment. Since a sepa-
rate budget constraint must be satised at every state  and the demand is homogenous
of degree zero in spot prices, the prices can be chosen in the simplex. In period 1 the
simplex is such that
P
l2L pl1 +
P
S2F (I)
P
j2J(S) qj(S) = 1; whereas in state  of period 2
it is such that
P
l2L pl() = 1:
The players of the generalized game are the traders and (1+) additional auctioneers.
Given a bourse structure F (I), each trader chooses a vector (xi1; x
i(1); :::; xi(); yi)(F (I))
on K to maximize ui1(x1; x(1); :::; x()), subject to constraints (4) and (5).
The rst auctioneer chooses period 1 commodities prices p1 2 IRL+ and assets prices q 2
IR
J(S1)
+  ::: IRJ(Sk)+ in order to maximize
B1 
X
l 6=L
pl1
X
i2I
(xil1   !il1) + pL1
X
i2I
(xiL1 +
X
Sk2F [i;I]
X
j2J(Sk)
gj(y
i
j)  !iL1)+X
Sk2F (I)
X
j2J(Sk)
qj
X
i2Sk
yij: (10)
The last part of B1 accounts for the fact that the asset market clearing is achieved
for each bourse. In period 2 there is an auctioneer for each node  2  that chooses the
commodity prices p() 2 IRL+ in order to maximize
B()  p()
X
i2I
 
xi()  !i() : (11-)
An equilibrium for this generalized game, parameterized in the bourse structure F (I), is
a vector (xI1; x
I(1); :::; xI(); yI ; p; q)(F (I)) such that, for each player (the n traders and the
(1+) auctioneers), the respective action solves his optimization problem parameterized
by the other players actions. We have that the generalized game has an equilibrium
since it satises all the assumptions of Debreus [1952] theorem. In fact, the auctioneers
objective functions (10) and (11-)2 are linear in their respective price variables, and
for each period and state, prices are in the simplex. Traders utilities are continuous
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and strictly concave by (A1.ii), and their choice variables (x1; x(1); :::; x(); y) belong
to non-empty, convex and compact sets. We can show that for this equilibrium there
is no excess of demand of commodities, that is,
P
i2I(x
i
1   !i1)  0 and
P
i2I(x
i()  
!i())  0; for every state : First, observe that B1  0 and B()  0 as B1 and B()
represent the aggregation of their respective tradersbudget constraints. Now we argue
that
P
i2I(x
i
l1   !il1)  0; l 6= L: Otherwise, there exists a commodity l0 6= L at period 1
with
P
i2I(x
i
l01 !il01) > 0. But, then the auctioneer would choose pl01 = 1; a contradiction
with B1  0: Analogously, for good L,
P
i2I(x
i
L1 +
P
Sk2F [i;I]
P
j2J(Sk) gj(y
i
j)   !iL1)  0,
which implies
P
i2I(x
i
L1   !iL1)  0 since gj(yij)  0, for all yij: By the same arguments,
it also holds that
P
i2Sk y
i
j  0; 8j 2 J(Sk);8Sk. The proof that there is no excess of
supply of commodities in each node  of period 2 follows by similar arguments, taking
into account the aggregation of budget constraints in every state and the fact that the
aggregated portfolios are non-positive.
We now consider a sequence of increasing closed cubes, Kn; with center at the ori-
gin. Then, for each cube in the sequence, x an equilibrium of the generalized game,
(xIn1 ; x
In(1); :::; xIn(); yIn)(F (I)): Notice that, as shown above, for each n and every i;
(xin1 ; x
in(1); :::; xin())(F (I)) 2 [0;Pi2I !i1]  Q2 [0;Pi2I !i()]: Moreover, the corre-
sponding sequence of equilibrium prices belongs to the simplex. Thus, there exists a con-
verging subsequence. Let (xI1; x
I(1); :::; xI(); p; q) denote the limit of this subsequence.
Let us assume that pL1 > 0 (we will prove this later). We now show that the correspond-
ing subsequence of portfolios also converges. Indeed, the rst order necessary and su¢ -
cient condition for trader i relative to an asset j in J(Sk); with Sk 2 F [i; I]; is  ~nq1 [qnqj +
p
nq
L1Dynqj
gj]+
X
2
~
nq
()p
nq
L ()aj() = 0; that is, ~
nq
1 p
nq
L1Dynqj
gj =
X
2
~
nq
()p
nq
L ()aj() 
~
nq
1 q
nq
j : Since the function gj is nonlinear, Dyjgj is continuous and D
2
yj
gj > 0 we conclude
that ynqj converges, provided that ~
nq
1 and ~
nq
() also converge and limnq ~
nq
1 > 0: We
prove that the sequence of Lagrange multipliers is bounded and, therefore, converges. For
each truncated economy, we have ui1(x
inq
1 ; x
inq(1); :::; xinq())  ui1(xi1; xi(1); :::; xi()):
Actually, there are non-negative multipliers (~
nq
1 ;
~
nq
(1); :::; ~
nq
()) such that, for each
nonnegative bundle, the following saddle point property is satised (see Rockafellar [21,
Theorem 28.3])
Li(x1; x(1); :::; x(); y; ~nq1 ; ~
nq
(1); :::; ~
nq
())  ui1(xi1; xi(1); :::; xi());
which turns into ~
nq
1 p
nq
1 !
i
1 +
X
2
~
nq
()pnq()!i()  ui1(xi1; xi(1); :::; xi()) if we choose
(x1; x(1); :::; x(); y) = 0: This inequality implies that the sequence of multipliers is
bounded since !i1  0; !i()  0 for each state ; pnq() belongs to the simplex for
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each state  and pL1 > 0:
Let yi be the portfolio limit. We prove now that (xI1; x
I(1); :::; xI(); yI ; p; q)(F (I)) is
an asset trading equilibrium. All budget constraints and inequalities
P
i2I(x
i
1   !i1)  0;P
i2I(x
i() !i())  0;Pi2Sk yij  0; 8j 2 J(Sk) and 8Sk; are satised, since all of them
hold in each truncated economy and, therefore, still hold in the limit.
To obtain market clearing in all markets we look at the rst order conditions of the
optimization problem of the rst period auctioneer, who chooses p1 and q. Let  denote
the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint
P
l2L pl1 +
P
S2F (I)
P
j2J(S) qj(S) = 1: Then,P
i2I(x
i
l1   !il1) =  for l 6= L;
P
i2I(x
i
L1 +
P
Sk2F [i;I]
P
j2J(Sk) gj(y
i
j)   !iL1) = ; andP
i2Sk y
i
j = ; 8j 2 J(Sk);8Sk: But by the Walraslaw we can write,
P
l 6=L pl1
P
i2I(x
i
l1 
!il1) + pL1
P
i2I(x
i
L1 +
P
Sk2F [i;I]
P
j2J(Sk) gj(y
i
j)   !iL1)+
P
Sk2F (I)
P
j2J(Sk) qj
P
i2Sk y
i
j =

P
l 6=L pl1 + pL1 + 
P
Sk2F (I)
P
j2J(Sk) qj =  (
P
l2L pl1 +
P
S2F (I)
P
j2J(S) qj(S)) = 0:
Since
P
l2L pl1 +
P
S2F (I)
P
j2J(S) qj(S) = 1 then  = 0 which implies market clearing in
all markets of period 1. The proof of market clearing in each state of nature for period
2 follows the same argument. Notice that market clearing in the asset market simplies
the Walraslaw in each state of nature to p()
P
i2I(x
i()  !i()) = 0:
Now, we show that, given the structure F (I) and prices (p; q)(F (I)); the vector (xi1; x
i(1);
:::; xi(); yi) is an optimal solution for consumer i with utility ui1(x1; x(1); :::; x()): Sup-
pose it were not, say (x^i1; x^
i(1); :::; x^i(); y^i) is budget feasible at (p; q)(F (I)); and ui1(x^
i
1; x^
i(1);
:::; x^i()) > ui1 (x
i
1; x
i(1); :::; xi()) : For n large enough (xi1; x
i(1); :::; xi(); yi) belongs to
the interior of the cube Kn; and for  small enough,  (x^i1; x^
i(1); :::; x^i(); y^i) + (1  
) (xi1; x
i(1); :::; xi(); yi) belongs to Kn; is budget feasible at prices (p; q)(F (I)) and
ui1((x^
i
1; x^
i(1); :::; x^i()) + (1   )(xi1; xi(1); :::; xi())) > ui1(xi1; xi(1); :::; xi()) by strict
concavity of the utility function. By continuity of preferences,  (x^i1; x^
i(1); :::; x^i(); y^i) +
(1  )(xinq1 ; xinq(1); :::; xinq(); yinq) would be chosen instead of (xinq1 ; xinq(1); :::; xinq();
yinq) in the truncated economy associated to Knq at prices (pnq ; qnq)(F (I)); a contradic-
tion.
Finally, let us prove that pL1 6= 0: Suppose pL1 = 0: Let eL1 be the canonical vector
in the direction of this commodity. Monotonicity allows to conclude that ui1((x
i
1; x
i(1); :::;
xi()) + keL1) > u
i
1(x
i
1; x
i(1); :::; xi()): Let k = minl2L !il1; then for n large enough,
p
nq
L1 < 1 and u
i
1((1   pnqL1)(xinq1 ; xinq(1); :::; xinq()) +keL1) > ui1(xinq1 ; xinq(1); :::; xinq()):
But the bundle ((1 pnqL1)(xinq1 ; xinq(1); :::; xinq())+keL1; (1 pnqL1)yinq) would be a¤ordable
at prices (pnq ; qnq) which contradicts the fact that (xinq1 ; x
inq(1); :::; xinq(); yinq) is an
equilibrium for the truncated economy Knq : 
Proof of Proposition 1: This proof is a consequence of the following four steps.
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Step 1 : ~xi(F [i; I]) is a C1 function in prices p and q.
For this, notice that this proof does not follow straightforward the well known proof
of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [1986, Section 3] since in our context with multiple
bourse membership it is possible that there exists the same asset in two bourses to which
a trader might belong. This introduces a linear dependence in the asset structure for
this trader. That is the asset structure may not be full column rank. The non-linear
function g allows us to solve this problem, in the same way as the bid-ask spread solves
an analogous problem in Faias [2008].
Let us x pL1 = 1 and pL() = 1, for every . The rst order necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for trader is problem are:
D1u
i
1   ~1p1 = 0
Du
i
1   ~()p() = 0;  = 1; :::;
 p()(x()  !i()) + Aiy = 0;  = 1; :::;
~
T
Ai   ~1[q +Dyg] = 0
 p1(x1   !i1)  qy   g(y) = 0
where T refers to the transpose of a matrix and g(y) =
P
j gj(yj). The columns of the
return matrix Ai = j   A(S)    j are those A(S) with S 2 F [i; I]: Then, the element Ai
denotes the line  of the return matrix Ai:
The Jacobian matrix with the second order derivatives with respect to (x1; x(); ~(); y;
~1), with x() and ~() generic elements of the corresponding -vector, is:
J =
26666664
D21u
i
1 0 0 0  p1
0 D2u
i
1  p() 0 0
0  p()T 0 Ai 0
0 0 Ai
T  ~1D2yg  q  Dyg
 p1 0 0  qT  DygT 0
37777775
It is easy to see that the matrix J is non-singular. In fact, let z = (x1; x(); (); y; 1)
such that Jz = 0, then zTJz = 0, and using Jz = 0, it reduces to xT1 (D
2
1u
i
1)x1 +
x()T (D2u
i
1)x()  yT (v1D2yg)y. Notice that this last equality can be written as
h
xT1 x()
T yT
i264 D
2
1u
i
1 0 0
0 D2u
i
1 0
0 0  1D2yg
375
264 x1x()
y
375
which implies x1 = 0, x() = 0, and y = 0 by negative deniteness of D2ui1 and 1D
2
yg.
Then, back to Jz = 0, we obtain () = 0. Finally, again with Jz = 0, 1 = 0. Therefore,
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by the implicit function theorem, we conclude that individual excess demand is a C1
function.
Step 2 : For any choice of utilities U  (ui1)i2I in a given utility space U, there exists a
generic set W (U) of endowments, such that for every economy (I; ), (i) (i 2 I) char-
acterized by ui1 and (!
i)i2I 2W (U), the set of asset trading equilibria is a continuously
di¤erentiable function of the endowments.
This proof follows the lines of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis[1986] proof of generic
regularity. Our framework is di¤erent however, as we must adapt their proof to an eco-
nomy where: 1) the asset market clearing occurs in each bourse; 2) the trading period
accounts for assets and commodities; and 3) trading of assets involve paying g, which is
itself a function of the asset trading.
Denote the price domain in period 1 by M1 = IRL 1++  IR
P
S2F (I) J(S)
+ : In state  of
period 2 the price domain is M() = IRL 1++ : Then, let M =M1 M(1) :::M(): In
every node we can normalize the price of the numeraire commodity to be 1. Denote by
f : UW M+!IR(L 1)(+1)  IR
P
S2F (I) J(S) the aggregate excess demand function of
commodities (other than the numeraire) and assets, given utilities, endowments, commo-
dity prices, and asset prices. Let us x the utilities to U and show that f restricted to U ,
denoted by fjU , is transverse to 0 (see Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [1986, Section 5]).
That is, if for all (!; p; q) 2W M+ with fjU (!; p; q) = 0; the Jacobian matrix D(!;p;q)fjU
has full rank. This amounts to showing that there exists a set of independent vectors of
directional derivatives that has dimension (L  1)( + 1) +PS2F (I) J(S):
Let us x an element (!; p; q) 2 f 1jU (0) and a given trader i: Now, consider an increase
of one unit in !il() with l 2 LnL, and a decrease in the endowment of the numeraire
good, !iL(); in pl() units. Trader is demand of good l remains unchanged in  , but the
total supply in the l-commodity market in state  has increased one unit. Thus, there is a
net e¤ect of aggregate excess demand of (0; :::; 1; :::; 0): This same argument also holds
in period 1.
Consider a bourse S and let trader k be the trader with the only membership in
this bourse S (guaranteed by assumption). Now, for each asset j(S) = 1; :::; J(S) in
this bourse, we can increase !kL() by aj(S)(), for all , and decrease !
k
L1 by qj(S) +
(gj(S)(y
k
j(S))  gj(S)(ykj(S)  1)): The only e¤ect on trader ks demand is a decrease in asset
j(S) by one unit. As a consequence, the aggregate excess supply of asset j(S) is now
(0; :::; 1; :::; 0): This argument holds for any asset j(S) in each bourse S: This proves
Step 2.
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Let us conclude this Step 2 with two observations. First, notice that in each bourse we
need to work with the trader k chosen above, since in an environment of multiplicity of
bourse memberships, a trader who belongs to two di¤erent bourses could have available
the same asset in two di¤erent bourses. If this occurs, nothing guarantees that the previous
argument holds. Second, the assumption of matrix A(S) having full rank is needed in this
proof to guarantee that the increase of !kL() by aj(S)() is o¤set by a change in trader
ks demand of asset j(S), and is not o¤set by an equivalent change in the demand of the
co-linear assets.
Step 3 : There exists a generic set U0W0, such that for every economy (I; ), (i) (i 2
I) with (ui1)i2I 2 U0 and (!i)i2I 2W0, the set of asset trading equilibria is a continuously
di¤erentiable function of both the endowment and the utility assignment.36
The proof mimics Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis[1986] proof of generic strong reg-
ularity, since for that proof the asset positions are xed, and hence our bourse economy
does not pose any further complication to their arguments (observe that for this proof we
need to show that fjU is transverse to 0, which has already been proven in the previous
Step 2).
Step 4 : There exists a generic set of economies for which, given  > 0; there is a  > 0
such that for any set I and pair of economies (I; ) and (I; ); if d((i); (i))   for
any i; then jU(i)1 (F [i; I])  U(i)1 (F [i; I])j < :
The proof of this last step follows by the continuity of ui1 (by A1.ii) and the continuity
of asset trading equilibria (Step 3). 
Now, at this part of the proof of Theorem 1, we must observe that, given a bourse
structure, the asset trading equilibrium may not be unique. This would imply that there
is an indirect utility U i1 (F [i; I]) for each equilibrium solution, and thus more than one
function V i(xi0; F [i; I]): Existence of an equilibrium for the bourse economy would require
choosing a measurable selector of the equilibrium correspondence E(). Then, we have to
consider that for each bourse structure F (I), the utility U i1 is evaluated at ~x
i(F [i; I]), the
respective equilibrium consumption bundle of trader i at the equilibrium selection. The
next proposition asserts the existence of a measurable selection.
Lemma 2: There exists a measurable selection ~xI(F (I)) = (~xi(F [i; I]) : i 2 I) for the
equilibrium correspondence E(F (I)).
Proof of Lemma 2: The proof follows by the Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski measura-
36A set is a continuously di¤erentiable function if all its elements are continuously di¤erentiable func-
tions.
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ble selection theorem (a weak measurable correspondence with non-empty closed values
into a separable metrizable space admits a measurable selection)37. In fact, we have that
F(I) is a nite set, and therefore the equilibrium correspondence E() dened in F(I) is
trivially a weak measurable correspondence (see Aliprantis and Border [2006, p. 600]).
The correspondence takes values in the positive coordinate subset of a nite dimensional
space and therefore it follows immediately that it is a separable metrizable space.
The correspondence E() takes closed values, i.e., if (xI;s1 ; xI;s(1); :::; xI;s(); yI;s; ps; qs)
is a sequence in E(F (I)) that converges to (xI1; x
I(1); :::; xI(); yI ; p; q); then (xI1; x
I(1); :::;
xI(); yI ; p; q) also belongs to E(F (I)): Given an equilibrium sequence, if we consider the
budget constraints of each trader and pass to the limit, we obtain that in the limit the
budget constraint of each trader is satised. The same reasoning allows us to prove that
the market clearing also holds in the limit.
Finally, it remains to show that in the limit each trader is maximizing his utility.
Suppose not, so for a trader i there exists another bundle (xi; yi) which is budget feasible
and such that ui1(x
i) > ui1(~x
i): Now, let (xi; yi) = (~xi;s+(1 )xi; yi;s+(1 )yi) with
 2 [0; 1]: Observe that (xi; yi) is budget feasible for s large enough and for  close to
one. Moreover, by continuity we have that ui1(x
i) > ui1(~x
i;s), for s large enough. Then,
the strict quasiconcavity implies that ui1(x
i) = ui1(~x
i;s + (1   )xi) > ui1(~xi;s): This
is a contradiction because ((~xi;s)i2I; yI;s; ps; qs) was an equilibrium for the given bourse
structure F (I):
An immediate consequence of Lemma 2 is that V i(x0; F [i; I]) is well dened.
Lemma 3: Let us assume that A1, A2, and A3 hold. Then there exists a generic set
of bourse economies for which there is a c("0)-equilibrium with possibly ever-increasing
gains from larger bourses.
Proof of Lemma 3: To prove Lemma 3 we need to assure that all assumptions
required in AW [2008, Theorem 2] are satised. In the next items we rewrite AWs
assumption in our notation, to make clear how our steps proceed in the proofs.
First we indicate that our assumption (A1.i) over utility ui0(x0) implies AWs assump-
tions (a) monotonicity, (b) continuity, and (c) convexity on V i(; F [i; I]).
AWs condition (d) Desirability of endowmentcan be rewritten with our notation as
37We remark that the equilibrium correspondence is dened in the nite set of bourse structures,
and therefore, a continuous measurable selector is not needed. Continuous selectors are in general used
to construct continuous objective functions. Thus, they only t if the correspondence is dened in a
continuum set.
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follows:
if ui0(!
i
0   1)U i1(fig) < ui0(xi0)U i1(F [i; I]); then x0  0:
We show this by contradiction. Assume xl0 = 0 for some l: Then, ui0(x
i
0)U
i
1(F [i; I]) = 0
by (A1.iii). Now, ui0(!
i
0   1)U i1(fig) > 0 since !i0   1  0 and ui0(x0) is increasing
(by (A1.i)). Finally, U i1(fig)  0 since U i1(fig)  ui1(!i1; !i(1); :::; !i()) > 0 by (A1.vi).
Thus, we obtain an impossibility.
AWs condition (e) Private goods are valuablesays that, given any attribute  and
any " > 0; there is " > 0 such that, for all i 2 I with (i) =  and all xi0 2 IRL+;
V i(xi0; F [i; I]) + 

" < V
i(xi0 + "1; F [i; I]) holds. This assumption is implied by our as-
sumption (A1.iv). Actually, given " > 0 and given " > 0 satisfying assumption (A1.iv),
and for any xi0; we have (u
i
0(x
i
0 + "1)  ui0(xi0))U i1(F [i; I])  (ui0(xi0 + "1)  ui0(xi0))  > ",
where the rst inequality follows by the optimality of the equilibrium ~x(F [i; I]) and the
denition of , whereas the last inequality follows by assumption (A1.iv).
AWs condition (g), Continuity with respect to attributes 2, says that, given " > 0;
there exists  > 0 such that for any set I and pair of economies (I; ) and (I; ); if
d((i); (i))   for any i; then !(i)0  !(i)0 + "1; where 1 = (1; :::; 1) 2 IRL. This is
precisely what was assumed in (A1.i).
AWs assumption (h), Continuity with respect to attributes 3 is precisely our as-
sumption (A2).
Let us prove AWs assumption (f), which says that given " > 0, there exists  > 0,
such that, for any set I and pair of economies (I; ) and (I; ); if d((i); (i))  ; then
V (i)(xi0; F [i; I
]) < V (i)(xi0 + "1; F [i; I
]); for any i and any xi0 2 IRL. Proposition 1 as-
serts that, for each bourse structure F (I); there is a generic set U0W0(F (I)) where the
assets trading equilibrium is continuous in tradersattributes. Now, the nite intersection
U00 W00  TF (I)2F(I)(U0 W0(F (I))) is a generic set, where the assets trading equili-
brium is continuous in tradersattributes for every bourse structure. Given an economy
(I; ) belonging to the generic set U00 W00, we can nd a compact subset of economies
containing (I; ) (since U00W00 is open) where Proposition 1 holds. We now prove that
assumption (f) of AW holds in this compact set of economies for xi0 
P
!i0 + ", with
" > 0.38. Now, given " > 0; by assumption (A1.v), there exists " > 0 and 1 > 0 such
that if d((i); (i))  1; then u(i)0 (xi0 + "1)  u(i)0 (xi0) > ": By Proposition 1, there
exists 2 > 0 such that, if d((i); (i))  2; then jU(i)1 (F [i; I])  U(i)1 (F [i; I]) j < u1u0";
where u0 and u¯ 1
are the upper and lower bounds in assumption (A1.vi). Now, we prove
38Observe that AW [2008, p. 271-272] only require assumption f) to be satised for a consumption xi0
bounded above by the aggregate endowments plus some " > 0.
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that there is a  > 0 such that, if d((i); (i))   for all i; the following inequality holds
V (i)(xi0; F [i; I
]) < V (i)(xi0 + "1; F [i; I
]), which can be written as
u(i)(xi0)U
(i)
1 (F [i; I]) < u
(i)(xi0 + "1)U
(i)
1 (F [i; I]) :
This inequality is equivalent to
u(i)(xi0 + "1)  u(i)(xi0) >
u(i)(xi0)
U
(i)
1 (F [i; I])
(U
(i)
1 (F [i; I])  U(i)1 (F [i; I])):
If  = minf1; 2g; then the previous inequality holds. To see this, notice that if
d((i); (i))   for all i; then
u(i)(xi0 + "1)  u(i)(xi0) > " > (u0=u¯ 1)(U
(i)
1 (F [i; I])  U(i)1 (F [i; I])) 
 (u(i)(xi0)=U(i)1 (F [i; I]))(U(i)1 (F [i; I])  U(i)1 (F [i; I])):
It remains to show that our economy satises AWs assumption Desirability of wealth,
which says that there is x0 2 IRL+ and an integer  such that for any economy (I; ) and
any i 2 I; there is a coalition S 2 I with jSj   and a club structure F (S) satisfy-
ing V i(xi0 + x

0; F [i;S])  V i(xi0; F [i; I]), for any F (I) and any xi0 2 IRL+: Notice that by
(A3), ~x(fig) satises ui0(xi0+x0)ui1(~x(fig))  ui0(xi0) ui1(
P
i(!
i
1; !
i(1); :::; !i())); and also
observe that ui0(x
i
0)u
i
1(
P
i (!
i
1; !
i(1); :::; !i()))  ui0(xi0) ui1(F [i; I]): Then, transitivity im-
plies that ui0(x
i
0 + x

0)u
i
1(~x(fig))  ui0(xi0)ui1(F [i; I]); which satises the Desirability of
wealthassumption for a bourse S = fig (and therefore, for  = 1 in AWs terminology).

Proof of Proposition 2: The proof is by contradiction. Assume that condition (SC)
holds, and also that there is a bourse S whose traders improve upon bourse S (that is, for
all i 2 S, ui0(!i0   i(S))U i1 (S)  ui0(!i0   i(S))U i1 (S), with strict inequality for some
i 2 S). The latter is equivalent to !i0  i(S)  (!i0  i(S))

U i1(S
)
U i1(S)

, since the inverse
of ui0 is strictly increasing and homogeneous of degree . Aggregating over all traders
in S, we get
P
i2S(!
i
0   i(S)) >
P
i2S(!
i
0   i(S))

U i1(S
)
U i1(S)

: Since U
i
1(S
)
U i1(S)
> 0 and
i(S)  z(S) (as !i0  z(S) and !i0  i(S)), we get z(S)
P
i2S

U i1(S
)
U i1(S)

  z(S) >P
i2S

U i1(S
)
U i1(S)

  1

!i0, a contradiction with (SC).
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Supplementary Material:
Computation procedures to the examples
Abstract. In this Supplementary Material we provide the computation proce-
dures to solve the examples of the paper Endogenous bourse structures. This
material is not for publication.
Procedure to compute U i1(S) for examples 1, 2, and 3: With out loss of general-
ity, consider any bourse S = S1; S2; S3; S4; S5: Given that markets are complete, we nd
the Radner equilibrium by solving the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, where each consumer i
maximizes ui(x1; x2; x3) subject to his budget constraint
P
 p(x !i) = 0; and markets
clear,
P
i x
i
 =
P
i !
i
, 8: The procedure is standard. The steps are:
1) Take the rst order condition of the Lagrangian function Li with respect to the
consumption variables and shadow price i (one Arrow-Debreu restriction). We then
obtain i(p!i) and xi(p!
i); for all , where p!i  p1!i1 +
P
=1;2 p()!
i(): In general,
we obtain the following expressions: xi1 =
i1p!i
p1i and x
i() = 
i()p!i
p()i for  = 1; 2;where
i = i1 +
P
=1;2 
i():
2) Substitute these values in the Arrow-Debreu market clearing equilibrium condi-
tions (see condition (D1.ii)) for bourse S and obtain the commodity prices that clear the
markets. We obtain:
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
p1 4 2 1.2941 8 8
p(1) 1 1 1 21 5
p(2) 1 1 1 5 21
Table SP-1
3) Find the equilibrium consumption values using these prices. We obtain
x11 x
1(1) x1(2) x21 x
2(1) x2(2)
S1 2 8 0 2 0 8
S2 3 6 0 3 0 6
S3 4.0909 5.2941 0 4.0909 0 5.2941
S4 5.5 2.0952 0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
S5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.5 0 2.0952
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Table SM-2
x31 x
3(1) x3(2) x41 x
4(1) x4(2)
S1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
S2 4 4 4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
S3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.8182 4.7059 4.7059
S4 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.5 1.9048 8
S5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.5 8 1.9048
Table SM-3
4) Substitute the equilibrium consumption values in the utility function to obtain the
traders indirect utility in the second stage when he belongs to that bourse S. These
values for bourses S1; S2 and S3 are given in Example 1. The indirect utility values for
bourses S4 and S5, needed in Example 2, are given in the following table. Notice that
the indirect utilities of the traders that do not belong to any bourse are obtained by
evaluating the traders utility ui1 in his good endowments (there is only one good and all
traders have their utilities strictly increasing in the consumption of this good).
S4 = (1; 4) S5 = (2; 4)
U11 (S
4) = 2:4444
u21(!
2) = 1:3862
u31(!
3) = 2:4849
U41 (S
4) = 3:1819
u11(!
1) = 1:3862
U21 (S
5) = 2:4444
u31(!
3) = 2:4849
U41 (S
5) = 3:1819
Table SM-4
The following step is only needed for Example 1.
5) Given that we are in a complete markets framework, the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
coincides with the Radner equilibrium. Therefore, to compute traders portfolios we
substitute the above Arrow-Debreu equilibrium consumption values in the corresponding
Radner restrictions:
xi()  !i() 
X
j=1;2
aj()y
i
j = 0, for  = 1; 2:
Solving for each traders system of equations and unknowns, we get the asset trades of
a trader in the bourse S: The values are given in Table 2 of the paper.
Procedure to compute examples 2 and 3: The non-anonymous membership fees
are obtained by considering a welfarist agent that maximizes the weighted sum of indirect
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utilities subject to individual budget constraints in period 0. That is, the maximization
problem is max(i)i2S
P
i2S(1=2) (lnx
i
0)U
i
1(S)

subject to xi0 = !
i
0   i(S); 8i 2 S; andP
i2S 
i(S) = z(s): Budget constraint in period 0 can be written with equality, as utility
is increasing in the consumption of the single good. The membership fee formulas are
obtained by taking the rst order condition with respect to (i(S))i2S: The memberships
fees for bourses S1; S3; S4 and S5 are given in the text of Example 2, whereas the
membership fees for bourse S2 are given in the text of Example 3.
Given the good endowments at period 0 and the membership fees values, we obtain
the consumption values and indirect utilities at period 0 for bourses S1; S3; S4 and S5
(the values for bourse S2 are not needed in our examples). These are39
x10 x
2
0 x
4
0
S1 4 4 5.9
S3 3.5111 3.5111 3.8778
S4 2.9978 7 3.9022
S5 7 2.9978 3.9022
V 1 V 2 V 4
S1 1.9218 1.9218 2.0253
S3 1.9312 1.9312 2.3016
S4 1.3418 1.3488 2.1662
S5 1.3488 1.3418 2.1662
Table SM-5 Table SM-6
Procedure to compute example 4: The equilibrium of the second stage is com-
puted by solving a Radner type economy (one budget constraint for each node). By writing
each traders budget constraints for states 1 and 2 in period 2 in equality form, and substi-
tuting the state-consumption expressions in the utility function of the second stage, we get
the following objective functions: for trader 5, (1=2) ln(4  q(S6)y5(S6)  q(S7)y5(S7))+
ln(2 + y5(S6) + y5(S7)); for trader 6, ln(2   q(S6)y6(S6))+ (1=2) ln(6 + y6(S6)); for
trader 7, ln(2   q(S7)y7(S7))+ (1=2) ln(6 + y7(S7)). Portfolios parametrized in asset
prices are then obtained by solving the system of rst order conditions on these ob-
jective functions. For traders 6 and 7, these are y6(S6) = (2   12q(S6))=3q(S6) and
y7(S7) = (2   12q(S7))=3q(S7). The rst order conditions for trader 5 determine a sys-
tem of two equations and two unknowns:  0:5q(S
6)
6 q(S6)y5(S6) q(S7)y5(S7)+
1
2+y5(S6)+y5(S7)
= 0 and
 0:5q(S7)
6 q(S6)y5(S6) q(S7)y5(S7)+
1
2+y5(S6)+y5(S7)
= 0: These two equations imply that q(S6) = q(S7):
Denoting this price by q, and solving for y5(S6) + y5(S7) in one of these two equations,
we get y5(S6)+y5(S7) = (12 2q)=3q: Now, using the asset market clearing equations for
the multiple memberships bourse structure, y5(S6)+ y6(S6) = 0 and y5(S7)+ y7(S7) = 0;
39Numbers in italics indicate that trader is consumption xi0 and utility u
i are evaluated at the traders
good endowments (as the trader does not belong to any bourse).
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we get q(S6) = q(S7) = 8=13 (notice that there is only one good and also that traders
6 and 7 are symmetric in preferences and endowments in the second stage). Portfo-
lios are (y5(S6); y5(S7)) = (35=12; 35=12); y6(S6) =  35=12 and y7(S7) =  35=12: On
the other hand, it can be shown that for the bourse structure with a unique bourse
S8 = (5; 6; 7), with market clearing equation y5(S8)+ y6(S8)+ y7(S8) = 0, portfolios are
y5(S8) = 70=12; y6(S8) =  35=12 and y7(S8) =  35=12: Indirect utilities in the second
stage are U51 = 2:4982; U
6
1 = 1:8940 and U
7
1 = 1:8940, for either the bourse structure with
multiple memberships or the bourse structure with a unique bourse. However, member-
ship fees are di¤erent in the two types of bourse structures, which will determine di¤erent
traders indirect utilities in period 0. These are: 5(S6) = 5(S7) = 4:7619; 6(S6) =
7(S7) = 1:2380; 5(S8) = 10:2310; 6(S8) = 7(S8) = 5:3846: Then, consumptions at
period 0 are obtained using the respective Radner restriction xi0 = !
i
0  
P
S:i2S 
i(S):
These are x5(fS6; S7g) = 5:4762; x6(S6) = x7(S7) = 7:7620; x5(S8) = 4:769; x6(S8) =
x7(S8) = 3:6154: The indirect utilities in period 0 are given in the text of Example 4.
Procedure to compute Example 5: Bourse S9 is characterized by incomplete
markets and therefore the procedure to compute equilibrium is di¤erent that the one
described above when markets are complete. For bourse S9 the equilibrium for the second
stage is obtained by solving a Radner type economy (one budget constraint for each node).
The steps are:
1) Since there is only one good, we can make the price of the good equal to 1 in every
node. Then, we write the Radner budget constraints in equality form and obtain the
equilibrium consumption (xi1 = !
i
1   q1yi1 and xi() = !i() + a1yi(), for  = 1; 2).
Consumption in period 1 is then parametrized by the asset trades and good endowment,
while consumption at node  of period 2 is parametrized by the asset returns and good
endowment.
2) Substitute these parametrized consumption functions in the utility function ui1(x
i
1;
xi(1); xi(2)) and take the rst order conditions with respect to yi(1) and yi(2) to obtain
the asset trades as a function of asset prices.
3) Apply asset market clearing equations (
P
i2S9 y
i = 0) to obtain the asset price:
q = 1. Then, substitute this price in the in the previous expressions to obtain asset
trades: y8(S9) = 10=3 and y9(S9) =  10=3:
In what follows we also indicate the values for the other bourses (with complete mar-
kets) S10; S11 and S12:
4) Substitute the values of (yi)i2S into period 1 and period 2 budget constraints to
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calculate the equilibrium consumption values (xi1; x
i(1); xi(2)).
S9 S10 S11 S12
(x81; x
8(1); x8(2)) (2.6666,5.3333,0) (4,4,0) n.a. (2.7964,6.4489,0)
(x91; x
9(1); x9(2)) (5.3333,2.6666,0) n.a. (2.909,4.8,0) (5.2389,3.0204,0)
(x101 ; x
10(1); x10(2)) n.a. (4,4,2) (1.0909 ,7.2,2) (1.9646,4.5306,3)
Table SM-7
These consumption values will determine the value of the indirect utility function:
S9 S10 S11 S12
U81 () 2.1643 2.0794 n.a. 2.378
U91 () 2.1643 n.a. 1.8521 2.2088
U101 () n.a. 2.426 2.3641 2.3978
Table SM-8
5) Membership fees are obtained using the formulas (8) and (9) given in the paper.
The values are:
S9 S10 S11 S12
8() 3 3.3077 n.a. 2.9144
9() 3 n.a. 3.4857 3.2051
10() n.a. 2.6922 2.5142 2.8804
Table SM-9
6) Substitute the values of the membership fees and good endowments in budget
constraint of period 0 and calculate consumption in period 0, xi0. Then, substitute the
value of xi0 in u
i
0, and obtain V
i(S) = (1=2) lnx0 U i1(xi1; xi(1); xi(2)). Table 5 in the
paper gives the values of tradersindirect utilities V i(S) at S9; S10; S11 and S12:
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